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Introduction 
 
There has been a developing debate about the performance of the 
Scottish economy under devolution and the effect of the expansion of the 
public sector on Scottish growth. Several commentators have expressed 
concern that the size of the public sector in Scotland is now a drag on growth, 
while others take a more sanguine view. This debate is well summarised in 
Marsh and Zuleeg (2006). However, this is a debate in which the evidence is 
often not well marshalled and there is often more heat than light generated. 
There is a suspicion that arguments about the effect and role of the public 
sector often derive more from the ultimate values and political preferences of 
proponents than from hard analysis and evidence.  
 
Table 1 makes clear that public spending in Scotland has grown rapidly 
under devolution. By 2007 the Scottish Executive’s Total Managed 
Expenditure (TME) has grown by 46%, in real terms, on the 1999 base. 
Between fiscal year 1999-00 and fiscal year 2003-04 total public spending as 
a share of GDP in Scotland rose from 45% to 51% (UK 37% to 41%). The 
Scottish Exec’s TME as a share of GDP rose from 20% to 25% over same 
period, while the public sector job share in Scotland remained unchanged at 
23% between 1999 and 2003, rising to 23.5% by 2005 (UK 19% to 20%). It is 
understandable that these changes have led to fears of ‘crowding out’: the 
potential negative impact of the growth of the public sector on the economic 
performance of the private sector in Scotland and by implication on the growth 
of the economy as a whole. 
 
In this paper we seek to shed some light on these matters by first 
considering the concept of crowding out in the context of Scotland’s political 
economy. Secondly, we provide a detailed analysis of the growth performance 
of the Scottish economy since devolution, which we think is revealing. 
However, the analysis is largely illustrative and descriptive and does not 
control for all the exogenous shocks that might have impacted on the Scottish 
economy during the period. We seek to remedy this in the third part of the 
paper by modelling the impact of the growth in public spending directly using a 
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version of the AMOS – A Macro-Micro Model of Scotland – computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model, which was developed by colleagues in the 
Fraser of Allander Institute, in the Department of Economics at the University 
of Strathclyde (Harrigan et al 1991, and Ferguson et al 2003). The final 
section of the paper concludes with some pointers for further research on the 
regional impacts of public spending growth.  
 
1. The concept of crowding out and Scotland’s political economy 
 
Crowding Out: concepts and evidence 
 
Taylor (1979) suggests “…the term ‘crowding out’ means expansion by 
the public (or administratively oriented) sector of the economy at the expense 
of the private (or market oriented) sector” (p.86). Taylor distinguishes between 
resource crowding out and financial crowding out. The former refers, in 
Taylor’s view, to the crowding out that can occur when the economy is at or 
near to full capacity. In these circumstances an increase in public expenditure 
will bid up wages, prices and interest rates until the economy is back in a new 
equilibrium with higher money wages and prices, unchanged real wages, 
unchanged aggregate output, a lower volume of private sector output and a 
bigger public sector.  
 
In contrast, Taylor suggests that crowding out may also occur due to 
the way in which public expenditure is financed even when there is 
considerable spare capacity in the economy. So for example, if a fixed money 
stock is maintained, interest rates will rise, crowding out private sector 
investment. Conversely, if the public spending increase is financed through 
increased taxation private sector spending will fall with any increase in 
aggregate demand no more and possibly less than the direct fiscal stimulus 
e.g. via the so-called ‘balanced budget multiplier effect’. Finally, if the theory of 
‘Ricardian Equivalence’1 holds household consumption will fall and savings 
                                                 
1 This theory, first mentioned and then dismissed by David Ricardo has in modern times been revived 
and advocated by Robert Barro of Harvard University (Barro, 1989). The theory contends that private 
 4
rise as higher taxation is anticipated to finance the increase in public 
spending. 
 
One simple way of looking at the crowding out issue is to recognise 
that the effect of a fiscal stimulus will depend on the position and elasticity of 
the aggregate supply (AS) and aggregate demand (AD) curves relating the 
aggregate price level to aggregate output in the economy in question. The 
traditional, or classical, view of crowding out discussed above assumes either 
of two possible situations in the face of a fiscal stimulus. First, an AS curve 
with zero price elasticity (vertical) is assumed, producing complete resource 
crowding out. Secondly, no change in aggregate demand occurs in the new 
equilibrium because private sector demand is wholly displaced through 
financial crowding out by, for example, an increase in interest rates, or 
through actual or anticipated tax increases, as public spending rises.  
 
At the other extreme there is what might be termed a Keynesian ‘fixed-
price’ situation, where the AS curve is infinitely price elastic (horizontal). Here 
the fiscal stimulus, in the absence of financial crowding out, generates a shift 
in aggregate demand equal to the size of the direct fiscal stimulus plus the 
secondary multiplier effects.  
 
It can be argued that either assumption of a vertical or horizontal 
aggregate supply curve over reasonable time horizons is too extreme. Modern 
macroeconomics assumes that in the short run the AS curve will be upward 
sloping for one or more of 4 reasons: nominal wage or price rigidities, or 
stickiness, an explanation favoured by the so-called New Keynesians, and 
worker misperceptions and producer misinformation leading to confusion 
about real and nominal magnitudes. The latter two explanations are favoured 
by the so-called New Classicals who take the view that demand shocks only 
have real economic effects if they are unanticipated by workers and/or 
producers (Mankiw, 2006)  
 
                                                                                                                                            
consumption will be cut, private savings rise, in the face of an increased government deficit due to the 
increase in taxation that households anticipate will be required to finance the increased deficit. 
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In the long run it is assumed that either wages and prices become 
flexible, or perceptions coincide with reality, with the economy adjusting to its 
natural rate of unemployment and potential output, so that the AS curve 
becomes vertical as in the traditional classical model. But the short run is 
likely to persist for some time particularly if wage and price rigidities dominate2 
and/or prices do not adjust quickly enough to clear markets. These 
circumstances would appear to offer the possibility of unemployment 
‘equilibria’ above the natural rate and output ‘equilibria’ below potential or full 
employment output. The AS curve in a closed economy would then be upward 
sloping, with a decreasing elasticity approaching zero as full employment is 
reached. Madsen (1998) tests theories of aggregate supply using evidence 
from the OECD countries and concluded that the short-run AS curve was 
positively sloped due to sticky wages and prices. He could find no evidence in 
favour of the New Classical worker or producer misperception models. 
Moreover his findings indicate that it takes several years for wages and prices 
to adjust to their long-run equilibrium levels. 
 
So, it would appear that increased government spending either 
generates financial crowding out or, if that does not occur, there is the 
possibility of resource crowding out. However, resource crowding out, if it 
occurs, will not be complete and may be minimal as both the aggregate price 
level and aggregate real output increase. 
 
At this point several caveats should be entered. First, to the extent that 
crowding out of private sector activity does occur there is no way of knowing 
whether the value placed by the market on the private sector activity foregone 
is greater or less than the value to society of the increase in public spending 
on non-market activities such as health and education provision. Moreover, 
secondly, to the extent that private and public investment spending may raise 
                                                 
2 Due for example to long-term contracts, the costs of changing prices – ‘menu’ costs, and risk of loss 
of sales due price fluctuations in face of customer preferences for stable prices; inflexible real wages 
may be due to: ‘efficiency’ wage effects as firms pay above market clearing wage to attract more 
productive workers, reduce absenteeism and shirking and reduce labour turnover; and to ‘insider-
outsider’ effects as employees set a wage via union pressure above market clearing and the non-
employed outsiders are unable to change the position. There is also evidence that the nominal wage is 
particularly inflexible downwards (Bewley, 1999). 
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potential output e.g. through investments in education, R&D and 
infrastructure, it is unlikely that the net impact on potential output can be 
determined without a lot more information and analysis. Issues to be 
addressed here would include, the balance between investment and 
consumption in the public expenditure increase, and the nature of both the 
specific private investments forgone and the extra public sector investments 
and their respective impacts on output potential. 
 
Thirdly, there is also an inter-temporal dimension, which concerns the 
impact of increased public spending on growth. As noted above public 
spending investments in education, R&D and infrastructure may not only raise 
potential output but could move the economy to a higher growth path. 
Conversely, additional public spending whether on consumption or investment 
may through crowding out divert private sector spending and resources away 
from growth enhancing activities by reducing entrepreneurship, innovation, 
investment in physical and human capital and competition. This possible 
effect can be termed dynamic crowding out.  
 
It is in the context of the above second and third caveats that the 
argument put forward by Kerevan (2006a) should be considered. Kerevan 
argues that it is not simply the level but the composition of public spending 
that is significant for crowding out. Kerevan contends that tax-financed public 
spending that funds transfer payments to private households is less 
distortionary than tax-financed state consumption. This is because in the 
former resources are returned to the private sector, whereas in the latter 
resources are diverted away from the private sector and, he contends, relative 
prices are distorted. But there is no certainty that the replacement of private 
consumption with state consumption necessarily produces an inferior 
outcome. Is a pound spent by a household on a foreign holiday to be valued 
more than a pound spent by the state on cancer treatment? However, 
Kerevan’s particular worry appears to be the likely negative impact on private 
sector investment flows with, presumably, attendant implications for GDP 
growth. This could affect growth if private investment was affected but 
Kerevan does not specify the transmission mechanism whereby investment 
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would be damaged by high levels of state consumption. That does not mean 
of course that such a mechanism cannot be specified, via for example a fall in 
the returns to capital investment. But the increase in state consumption may 
well stimulate local suppliers raising expected future returns and thereby 
eventually encouraging more investment there. So, while such a harmful 
outcome of state consumption on investment and growth is possible it is not 
guaranteed and seems likely to depend on the particular circumstances 
surrounding the resource transfer and spending. In a recent overview of 
research in this area Handler et al (2005a) conclude that: 
 
“ … the empirical literature …. is inconclusive: although the growth 
and composition of public expenditures and taxes as well as fiscal 
stance seem to have some effect in the short run, their long-run 
implications (on productivity and growth) cannot be easily quantified 
…” (page 1). 
 
But Handler et al do note that different types or groups of public 
spending should be considered separately and their study only reviews the 
literature concerned with infrastructure, education, R&D and health spending. 
These spending categories embrace a varying mix of consumption and 
investment. But on health expenditures, which might be considered more 
social than economic spending with a high current consumption element, they 
conclude that 
 
“The evidence is mostly that health expenditures have a positive, 
sizeable, and statistically significant effect on aggregate output. Other 
studies question the size of estimated effects and claim that reverse 
causation may prevail.” (pp 37-38). 
 
Evidence is limited on the effect of public spending on other drivers of 
growth. Handler et al (2005a) conclude that the literature suggests overall that 
public expenditure on infrastructure appears to raise private sector output but 
with diminishing marginal returns (p. 36-37). Education improves the stock of 
human capital but there is much debate and conflicting evidence on its role in 
economic growth (Easterly, 2002). Handler et al (2005a) report that on the 
question whether government R&D expenditures crowd out research in the 
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private sector “the majority of estimates reject the crowding-out hypothesis.” 
(p. 37).  
 
There is concern about the impact of high public spending and a large 
public sector on entrepreneurial activities. Handler et al (2005a) argue that the 
burden of income tax is of particular significance for the entry of new firms into 
markets. However, detailed research in this area suggests that the rate of 
entrepreneurial activity is affected by the tax structure rather than the rate of 
any particular tax. Under certain circumstances a high personal tax rate can 
encourage entrepreneurial activity3 (Cullen and Gordon, 2002; Lee and 
Gordon, 2005). Others argue that existence of public sector wage premiums 
(Blanchflower, 2000) – even if temporary – may attract workers from more 
risky private sector activities, which could include starting new firms (Bellante 
and Link, 1981). Although as Bell and Elliott (2005) point out this should imply 
a private rather than a public sector wage premium. But presumably other 
things are not equal and the public premium is accounted for by other factors. 
Nonetheless, the risk that a public sector wage and conditions premium might 
induce individuals away from new firm formation in the private sector would 
appear to be real. Again the evidence is limited, and contradictory suggesting 
the need for further research. Alesina et al (2001) found that the scale of 
public employment discouraged market activities in the south of Italy and in 
some estimations they found evidence of a negative effect on entrepreneurial 
activity. In contrast, recent work involving two of the present authors (Ashcroft, 
Plotnikova and Ritchie, 2007) found a positive relationship between new firm 
formation in British counties during the 1990s and the share of employment in 
public sector exerted together with urban agglomeration factors. A more 
"singular" effect of public sector could be obtained at smaller spatial units of 
analysis. 
 
A fourth caveat is that the performance and efficiency of the public 
sector and the impact of public spending on private sector economic activity 
                                                 
3A marginal personal income tax rate that is above the effective tax rate on business income provides 
an encouragement to self-employment. Moreover, since tax evasion may be easier for the self-
employed, high personal rates of tax that affect employees more than the self employed may encourage 
individuals to start their own businesses (Lee and Gordon, 2005) p.1031. 
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may vary according to the scale of the public sector in the economy. On the 
issue of scale and the performance and the efficiency of the public sector 
Afonso et al (2005) in a study of OECD countries broadly find that countries 
with small public sectors – public spending in year 2000 below 40% of GDP - 
show better economic performance and efficiency than those with medium – 
between 40% to 50% of GDP – and large  - more than 50% of GDP - public 
sectors. However, the literature survey of Handler et al (2005b) suggests that  
 
“Altogether, there are conflicting results concerning the relationship 
between government size and its performance. The discrepancies 
may be partly explained by differences in the country samples, the 
time period covered, and in the relations investigated.” 
 
Which leads them to conclude that 
 
“The size of government is perhaps too broad a concept to capture a 
unidirectional causal relationship with government performance” 
(page 21). 
 
Turning now to the relationship between the scale of the public sector, 
crowding out, and the impact on productivity and growth Handler et al (2005a) 
conclude from their literature survey that 
 
“The evidence on the growth effects of government size points at a 
non-linear relationship: for small governments additional public 
expenditures have a positive impact on growth, while for large 
governments further additions tend to be growth retarding. It is an 
open question, however, where the optimum is located.” (Page 1) 
 
 
This finding of an inverted U shaped relationship would appear to 
have intuitive merit if smaller governments when increasing their spending 
do so on necessary infrastructure investments, while larger governments 
spend more on consumption and transfer payments. Some empirical 
support for this is provided by evidence from the study by Afonso et al 
(2005) who find that in economies with large governments incomes are on 
average more evenly distributed. So, there may be trade offs between 
equity and efficiency with respect to the size of government. But from the 
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standpoint of growth and efficiency it is not clear where the optimum is 
located, although Handler et al (2005) note that empirical estimates of the 
optimal size of public expenditures can be as low as 15% of GDP. They 
nevertheless argue, perhaps contentiously, that this is unduly low in a 
European context because of an effective path dependency reflecting a 
historic power struggle between various social groups, which could not be 
overturned without heavy costs. In view of this, they suggest that the 
optimum is around 40%. 
 
A fifth and final caveat affecting the likelihood and scale of crowding 
out is the degree of openness of an economy to trade and factor flows. 
With a fixed exchange rate and an open economy, the Mundell-Fleming 
model4 implies no financial crowding out following a fiscal expansion. An 
exogenous increase in domestic demand through the fiscal expansion 
generates capital inflows and an endogenous increase in the money 
stock. In the new equilibrium, the interest and exchange rates remain the 
same while aggregate demand rises by the full amount of the fiscal 
stimulus plus associated multiplier effects. This is not the case under 
flexible exchange rates where the appreciation of the exchange rate as 
the interest rate rises leads to a fall in export demand and a rise in import 
demand, with the result that the expansion of demand may be fully 
crowded out (Burda and Wyplosz, 1997). The significance of this result is 
that when the focus of attention is on the regional economic implications of 
fiscal stimuli then the situation is formally equivalent to the Mundell-
Fleming model of a national economy with fixed exchange rates. 
Moreover, the elasticities of inward and outward flows of productive 
resources, such as labour and physical capital, with respect to relative 
regional wage, price and productive opportunities tend to be higher at the 
regional than at the nation state scale (Harrigan et al, 1996). Following a 
demand injection, through increased public spending, for example, the 
increase in real wages, intermediate input prices and greater employment 
and productive opportunities, will over time produce a net inflow of 
                                                 
4 This is the open economy version of the traditional closed economy IS-LM macro model (Burda and 
Wyplosz, 1997). 
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productive resources. Aggregate supply will rise and any resource 
constraints prompted by the growth in public spending will be eased. 
 
Scottish and regional economy considerations 
 
It follows from the above analysis, that in a small, open economy that is 
part of a wider monetary and fiscal union the probability of financial crowding 
out due to an own fiscal stimulus is minimal. This is exactly the situation in 
Scotland, which under present constitutional arrangements shares the UK 
interest rate, the UK tax structure, and the exchange rate with the rest of the 
UK is fixed. In these circumstances, the money supply is endogenous, and 
taxes do not in the first instance have to rise to fund the expansion because of 
the subvention, via the Barnett formula and non-formula based funding, from 
London. Moreover, ‘Ricardian equivalence’ issues should be avoided given 
that taxes are set in London and experience suggests that Whitehall is 
prepared to sustain a Scottish budget deficit, which is small in the overall 
context of the UK’s public finances. In these circumstances the continuation of 
the subvention to Scotland is a political not an economic issue. 
 
The preceding discussion suggests that if Scotland is to be subject to 
crowding-out effects from its own fiscal stimuli they must occur via either the 
resource and/or dynamic crowding-out effects route, and more probably by 
the latter than the former. 
 
Kerevan (2006b) provides one of the few thoughtful assessments of the 
potential for crowding out in the contemporary circumstances of Scotland’s 
economy. He accepts the view that financial or ‘classical’ crowding out is 
irrelevant to the Scottish experience because we share common interest rates 
and tax rates with the UK. But he then goes on to offer an analysis of 
crowding out in Scotland that is simply untenable. Scotland is portrayed as a 
Third World country benefiting from windfall revenues from abroad – i.e. the 
UK Treasury. In Kerevan’s view, this inflow of expenditure in excess of 
revenues – up to 10% of GDP - leads to a ballooning trade deficit, relative 
price distortions, and resource misallocation. All of which, for him, serve to 
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undermine Scotland’s long-term growth and productivity, but no clear 
transmission mechanism is specified. Kerevan fails to acknowledge that in 
modern open economies, if not in the Third World, markets tend to adjust both 
within and between economies to ensure that resources flow in response to 
price and quantity signals. And as noted above these market adjustments are 
more powerful between the regions of a country. There is nothing in 
economics to suggest that a sustained financial subvention from the rest of 
the UK to Scotland will necessarily be damaging to Scotland’s economic 
performance. While resource and dynamic crowding out effects cannot be 
ruled out, they may be partial and offset by the output level and growth 
promoting effects of the increased public expenditure. Ultimately the issue can 
only be resolved by careful empirical, and preferably model based, analysis. 
 
 
2. Scottish growth under devolution 
 
Figure 1 highlights the overall growth of GVA in Scotland and the UK between 
the start of devolution – taken as 1999q2 – and 2006q1, using the Scottish 
Executive’s and ONS’s published GVA data series. The Figure distinguishes 
the total growth of the economy from the growth of public and private sector 
over the period.5 Over the 27 quarters since the Scottish Parliament took up 
its powers, the Scottish economy grew by just under 15%. The UK economy 
grew faster at just over 19%. The growth of the public sector is estimated to 
have been around 17% in both Scotland and the UK. Removing the growth of 
the public sector form the total leaves estimated private sector growth of 
under 14% in Scotland and just under 20% in the UK – a growth gap of just 
over 6 percentage points in the UK’s favour. 
                                                 
5 The public sector is taken to be the public administration, health and education and health sector. This 
is not a fully accurate measure of public sector production, since some private sector activity is 
included and a very small portion of public production is included in other sectors. There is no specific 
breakdown for public sector GVA as there is for public sector employment. 
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Source: Scottish Executive and authors’ calculations. 
 
Clearly, the private sector has laboured much more in Scotland during 
the devolution period than its counterpart in the UK. But it is difficult to argue 
that this weakness is due to the growth of the public sector in Scotland. The 
public sector grew comparably in both Scotland and the UK yet private sector 
growth was much weaker here. It is possible that the scale of the public sector 
in Scotland, at 22% of overall GVA compared to 18% in the UK, may be 
above some critical level so that comparable growth crowded out much more 
private sector activity here than in the UK. But as our model-based 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis discussed below shows this is 
probably fanciful. 
 
We do not need to look to the growth of the public sector and the 
complicated and uncertain process of ‘crowding out’ to see the most probable 
reason why Scotland’s private sector growth was so much weaker during 
devolution. Figure 2 identifies the growth of GVA in key private sectors since 
devolution. The sectors account for 97% of private sector GVA and 76% of the 
economy as a whole. What is interesting in Figure 2 is that 4 sectors - other 
services, real estate and business services, financial services and 
construction - accounting for 47% of Scottish private sector GVA, all 
outperformed their UK counterparts, with other services and financial services 
Figure 1: Scottish GVA Growth in Total and in Public and Private Sectors under Devolution - 
1999q2 to 2006q1
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considerably outperforming them. The remaining 4 sectors all under perform 
their UK counterparts. The growth of transport & communication while weaker 
here was broadly similar at 29% compared to 31% growth in the UK, so it is 
the weakness of the three other sectors: manufacturing, hotels & catering, and 
retail & wholesale, that stands out and is worthy of further investigation. 
 
Source: Scottish Executive and authors’ calculations. 
 
Manufacturing GVA has fallen by more than 12% in Scotland during 
devolution while UK manufacturing rose by just below 1% over the period. The 
reason for this should by now be well known. It very largely reflects the 
collapse of electronics production in Scotland due to the worldwide recession 
in the ICT industry and related structural readjustments. The structure of 
electronics in Scotland meant that the industry was hit harder by the recession 
than electronics in the UK (Ashcroft, 2006). Since devolution, electronics GVA 
has contracted by 34% in Scotland compared to a fall of 11% in the UK as a 
whole (which itself is affected by the Scottish contraction). The fall of 34% 
would have been sufficient to generate a contraction in Scottish 
manufacturing, which, other things equal, would have amounted to two-thirds 
of the 12% fall that actually occurred. 
 
Figure 2: Scottish GVA Grow th in Key Private Sectors under Devolution, 1999q2 to 2006q1
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It therefore follows that a reasonable narrative is that the large decline 
in electronics output over the period, with a comparable decline in 
employment, led to cutbacks and postponements of the expenditure plans of 
the affected households and this lowered spending in the high street affecting 
retail & wholesale as well as hotels & catering compared to what otherwise 
would have been the case. Over the period to 2006q1, retail & wholesale and 
hotels & catering grew by 10% and 7% in Scotland compared to growth of 
26% and 25% respectively in the UK. Since retail & wholesale is largely a 
domestically traded sector  - hotels and catering are much less so - there 
seems to be no other obvious relative development in the Scottish economy 
during the devolutionary period that could account for the disparity between 
the sector’s performance and its UK counterpart. It could be that Scottish 
households became more cautious over the period and began to save more 
but that seems an unlikely explanation for the scale of the performance 
differences in retail & wholesale between Scotland and the UK. 
 
Figure 3 takes this analysis a stage further and offers the results of 
several simulations using shift-share analysis where we substitute the growth 
and weight of UK sectors for their Scottish counterparts. We take UK growth 
over the devolution period to be 100. Given that, actual Scottish growth was 
20% lower at 80. When the growth of sectors in the UK is substituted for the 
growth rates of their Scottish counterparts this is sufficient to push overall 
Scottish growth to 93% of UK growth. But Scottish growth is not pushed to 
parity with the UK because some Scottish sectors were growing faster than 
their UK counterparts and the relative importance of each sector differs across 
the two countries. When the importance of each sector is held to be the same 
by applying UK sectoral weights to the actual Scottish growth in each sector, 
overall Scottish growth improves to 87% of the UK but not by much. This 
implies that Scotland’s growth gap with the UK over the period was much less 
one of a different structure of industry and much more one of different sectoral 
growth rates. So, replacing the Scottish manufacturing growth rate with its 
growth in the UK is sufficient in itself to push Scotland’s overall growth from 
80% to 92% of the UK. Doing the same for retail and wholesale pushes 
Scottish growth to 90% of the UK. However, when we replace both Scottish 
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manufacturing and retail & wholesale growth rates by the growth of their UK 
counterparts this is sufficient to push overall Scottish growth to 102 i.e. 2% 
above actual UK growth. 
Source: Scottish Executive and authors’ calculations. 
 
What all this suggests is that in seeking to explain the significant weakness 
of private sector growth in Scotland during devolution a very plausible story is 
that the cause was largely due to the collapse of electronics production and 
the knock-on demand, or multiplier, effects on high street spending. Nearly, 
half of the Scottish private sector, embracing financial services, business 
services & real estate, and other services, actually outperformed the UK 
private sector during the period. But the scale of the decline of the Scottish 
incidence of the world ICT recession, the decline in electronics and the 
dampening effect on the growth of high street spending was more than 
sufficient to outweigh the strong growth elsewhere in the Scottish service 
sector. The public sector grew comparably in Scotland and the UK and there 
would appear to be little justification for the view that weaker Scottish growth 
since devolution relative to the UK was due to growth of the public sector and 
the rise in its share of the economy.  
 
 
Figure 3: Scottish GVA Growth under Devolution 1999q2 to 2006q1 - Simulations
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3. CGE analysis of impact of growth in public spending under 
devolution 
 
The analysis in the preceding section was largely illustrative and descriptive 
and does not control for all the exogenous shocks that might have impacted 
on the Scottish economy during the devolutionary period. We seek to remedy 
this in this part of the paper by modelling the impact directly of the growth in 
public spending under devolution from 1999 to 2007 using a version of the 
AMOS – A Macro-Micro Model of Scotland – computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model, which was developed by colleagues in the Fraser of Allander 
Institute, in the Department of Economics at the University of Strathclyde 
(Harrigan et al 1991, and Ferguson et al 2003). 
 
The base year of the model is a Social Accounting Matrix for Scotland 
in 1998, but we assume that this represents the economy in 1999 and model 
the same percentage increases in government expenditure observed in 
Scotland in the years since 1999.  Total managed expenditure figures are 
used to calculate the government expenditure percentage increases.  These 
are firstly annualised from financial years to calendar years, and then the 
increases in government expenditure relative to 1999 are calculated.  These 
are given in the first two rows of Table 1.  The shocks to the model are 
inputted in each period, and then the model is calculated for equilibrium in that 
period.  The government expenditure shocks are “stepped” in, and are 
assumed to remain from 2008 onwards at the level of 2007.  The percentage 
shocks inputted to the model are given in the final row of Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Annualised Total Managed Expenditure (TME) and Changes from 1999 Base 
 
Calendar years 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008+ 
TME(£millions) 
(2004-05 prices) 17746.3 18424.5 19746 20917.5 22238.8 23350 24305 25306.3 25926.5 25926.5 
Cumulative 
change (%) 0.00 3.822 11.269 17.870 25.315 31.577 36.959 42.601 46.096 46.096 
Annual change 
%) 0.00 3.822 7.173 5.933 6.316 4.997 4.090 4.120 2.451 0.000 
Source: Answer to Scottish Parliament question S2W-24534 on 21 April 2006 
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The Model 
 
The model used is a variant of the AMOS model, built around a 1998 
Social Accounting Matrix for Scotland.  A full description of the model is given 
in Ferguson et al (2003). For our purpose, it is should be noted that this is a 
regional general equilibrium model parameterised on Scottish data.  In this 
CGE framework, there are three transactor groups – households, corporations 
and governments, 25 commodities and activities (represented by 25 sectors) 
and two exogenous external transactor groups (rest of the UK and rest of the 
world). 
 
Production is determined through cost minimisation with multi-level 
production functions, exhibiting constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
technology at all levels of the production hierarchy, with the exception of 
domestic intermediate transactions where a fixed coefficient (Leontief) form is 
assumed. 
 
Final demand consists of four components – consumption, investment, 
exports and government expenditure.  Consumption is a function of real 
disposable income.  Exports (and imports) are determined via an Armington 
link (Armington, 1969)6 and are therefore relative-price sensitive with trade 
substitution elasticities of 2.  Nominal government expenditure is taken to be 
exogenous – and the shocks involve changes to this variable. 
 
We assume a single Scottish labour market with perfect sectoral 
mobility, but, most importantly, we assume that wages are determined subject 
to a bargaining function in which the real consumption wage is directly related 
                                                 
6 The Armington Assumption “allows domestically produced and foreign produced goods to be 
imperfect substitutes in use, making the consumption of quantities of domestically produced and 
imported variants of the commodity to enter the representative consumer’s utility function as distinct 
elements. In empirical CGE formulations, this assumption helps to overcome the "specialization" 
problem. The Law of One Price implies extreme specialization in an economy where goods are 
produced under CRS and the number of commodities exceeds the number of factors of production.” 
(Vargas, Schreiner, Tembo & Marcouiller, 1999) Computable General Equilibrium Modeling for 
Regional Analysis in The Web Book of Regional Science, Regional Research Institute, West Virginia 
University. 
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to workers’ bargaining power, and therefore inversely related to the regional 
unemployment rate.  The bargaining function of this wage curve is taken from 
the regional econometric work of Layard et al (1991). 
 
We run the simulations below in a multi-period setting, given our 
interest in the period-by-period impacts of a series of expenditure shocks. 
These periods are interpreted as years, in that we have used annual data 
where we econometrically parameterise relationships, especially those that 
update variables between periods. Within AMOS, in each of these periods 
both the total capital stock and its sectoral composition are fixed, and 
commodity markets clear continuously. However, each sector's capital stock 
is updated between periods via a simple capital stock adjustment procedure, 
according to which investment equals depreciation plus some fraction of the 
gap between the desired and actual capital stock in each sector. This process 
of capital accumulation is compatible with a simple theory of optimal firm 
behaviour given the assumption of quadratic adjustment costs. Desired capital 
stocks are determined on cost-minimisation criteria and actual capital stocks 
reflect last period's stocks, adjusted for depreciation and gross investment. 
The economy is assumed initially to be in long-run equilibrium, where desired 
and actual capital stocks are equal. 
 
Population adjusts in the central case through net migration between 
Scotland and the rest of the UK, where net migration to Scotland is positively 
related to the real wage differential, and negatively to the unemployment rate 
differential, with the rest of the UK.  It is parameterised from the 
econometrically estimated model reported in Layard et al (1991).  Through 
sensitivity analysis we vary these elasticities of substitution making migration 
less responsive to unemployment rate and real wage differentials. 
 
The model is not a forecasting model in the sense that paths of 
variables are assumed, e.g. population, GDP, oil prices, etc., rather we 
assume that the economy is initially in equilibrium so that if it runs forward with 
no shocks it will recreate the initial base year values.  We run the model for 50 
periods, with positive permanent shocks to government expenditure in period 
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1 to 8 and then no further shocks from period 9 onwards. The simulation 
results that we report here compare the simulation results to the constant 
base scenario in which there are no shocks to the model.  All the differences 
therefore, can be attributed solely to the direct or indirect effects of the 
positive demand disturbance. 
 
Central simulation 
 
Initially, the increases in government expenditure raise demand for the 
products of those sectors from which the government purchases directly in the 
base year model.  Demand increases significantly in the “public administration 
and defence” and “education, health and social work” sectors.  The stimulus to 
demand in these sectors pushes up output prices, raising capital rental rates 
and increasing output.  Some crowding out of output occurs in the first period 
(when sectoral capital stocks are fixed) as the expansion in demand raises 
wages and the price of intermediate inputs for all sectors.  Sectors with the 
expenditure demand stimulus experience an increase in output, while those 
not stimulated directly experience a slight fall in output in the first period 
(2000) (Figure 4).  At the aggregate level, the increase in wages and lowering 
of the unemployment rate leads to positive in-migration to Scotland from 2001. 
 
Figure 4: Sectoral output in 2000, % change from 1999 
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From 2007 onwards, the increases in government expenditure stop and 
the economy begins adjusting to its new long-run equilibrium.  By tracking the 
key variables to 2049 we can see the dynamic time path of GDP, 
employment, exports and imports.  GDP increases significantly initially as 
government expenditure increases, but then from 2007 the rate of growth of 
GDP begins to slow.  By 2049, GDP is around 14% higher than in 1999 
(Figure 5).  Sectoral output, shown in Figure 4 in 2000, has recovered and in 
2049 the output of all sectors has increased relative to the 1999 (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 5: GDP impact from 1999 to 2049, % changes from base 
Figure 6: Sectoral output in 2049, % change from 1999 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
1 0
1 2
1 4
1 6
1999 200 4 20 09 2 014 2 019 2024 202 9 20 34 2 039 2 044 204 9
Yea r
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fr
om
 b
as
G DP
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 &
 F
is
hi
ng
Fo
re
st
ry
M
in
in
g 
&
 E
xt
ra
ct
io
n
M
fr 
- F
oo
d,
 D
rin
k 
&
To
ba
cc
o
M
fr 
- T
ex
til
es
 &
 C
lo
th
in
g
M
fr 
- 
Pa
pe
r, 
P
rin
tin
g 
&
Pu
bl
is
hi
ng
M
fr
 - 
C
he
m
ic
al
s 
et
c
M
fr 
- M
et
al
 &
 N
on
-M
et
al
G
oo
ds
M
fr 
- E
le
ct
ric
al
 &
In
st
ru
m
en
t E
ng
in
ee
rin
g
M
fr
 - 
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
 &
V
eh
ic
le
s
O
th
er
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
E
ne
rg
y 
& 
W
at
er
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
W
ho
le
sa
le
 &
 R
et
ai
l
H
ot
el
s,
 R
es
ta
ur
an
ts
 &
C
at
er
in
g 
R
ai
l &
 O
th
er
 L
an
d
Tr
an
sp
or
t
S
ea
 &
 A
ir 
Tr
an
sp
or
t &
Tr
an
sp
or
t S
up
po
rt
P
os
t &
Te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
Fi
na
nc
e 
&
 In
su
ra
nc
e
O
th
er
 B
us
in
es
s
A
ct
iv
iti
es
Pu
bl
ic
 A
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n 
&
D
ef
en
ce
E
du
ca
tio
n,
 H
ea
lth
 &
S
oc
ia
l W
or
k 
S
ew
ag
e 
& 
R
ef
us
e
D
is
po
sa
l
R
ec
re
at
io
n,
 C
ul
tu
re
 &
S
po
rt
O
th
er
 S
er
vi
ce
 A
ct
iv
iti
es
Sec tor
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 s
ec
to
ra
l o
ut
pu
t f
ro
m
 b
as
e 
by
 p
er
io
d
 22
Employment also increases significantly in line with the higher real 
wage encouraging both migration into Scotland, and movement of Scottish 
non-workers into the labour force.  The employment level by 2049 is around 
15.3% higher than in 1999 at 2.3million (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Employment from 1999 to 2049, % change from 1999 
 
The population of Scotland also increases with positive net migration 
(all population change is driven by inter-regional economic migration – we 
make no assumptions about Scottish demographic profiles).  Population 
increases significantly from 2001 onwards, before settling on its long-run 
equilibrium path movement.  By 2049, the Scottish population is around 
15.2% higher than in 1999 (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8:  Population from 1999 to 2049, % change from 1999 
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Exports and imports to Scotland in aggregate can be tracked (Figure 
9).  In the first few years, the demand shock crowds out export activity in 
favour of imports.  Output in some sectors is affected by increased labour and 
intermediate input costs, producing a loss of competitiveness and fall in GDP 
in these sectors.  Initially, imports to Scotland increase significantly, to around 
11.1% above the 1999 value in 2007, but this falls slightly over time, and in 
2049 is 10.7% higher than in 1999.  Exports from Scotland fall during the first 
eight years, falling by 4.7% by 2007, but by 2049, they have slowly recovered 
and are less than half a percent lower than in 1999. 
 
Figure 9: Scottish exports and imports to Scotland, % change from 1999 
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Figure 10: Absolute change in exports and imports by sector in 2049, £millions 
 
 
 
Table 2 summarises some of the key results of the central simulation. 
 
 
Table 2: CGE analysis of Scottish Executive TME change 1999 – 2007, Central 
Simulation: key results 
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Sensitivity analysis 
 
Some sensitivity analysis was undertaken to check the robustness of 
the central case impacts to our assumptions about key variables, namely the 
speed of migration elasticities in response to unemployment and real wage 
differentials.  We find that the results are generally robust for small changes in 
the elasticities, but less so for significant changes. 
 
The GDP impact (Figure 11) with medium migration elasticities is 
slightly lower than the central case for the fifty years from 1999 to 2049. 
However, after 2012 the percentage difference between the central case and 
the medium migration case is falling, with the medium migration case getting 
closer to the central case results.  By 2049, GDP in the medium migration 
case is 13.3% higher than in 1999, only slightly below the central case 
(14.0%). Both the low migration elasticity and the zero migration case reduce 
the scale the GDP impact.  Scottish GDP is 9.8% higher in the low migration 
elasticity case, and 4.6% higher in the zero migration case. 
 
Figure 11: GDP impact with different migration assumptions from 1999 to 2049, % 
change from base 
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The employment impacts under the different assumptions about 
migration are qualitatively similar to those for GDP, with the less responsive 
cases producing a smaller impact on employment than the central case 
(Figure 12).  Again, the medium migration case is similar in scale to the 
central case. 
 
Figure 12: Employment impact with different migration assumptions from1999 to 2049, 
% change from base  
Clearly the no-migration case will not produce any changes in  
population, however by reducing the migration elasticities we see a smaller 
increase in population.  The Scottish population by 2049 is between 8.4% (in 
the low elasticities case) and 15.2% (in the central case) higher (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: Population change with different migration assumptions from 1999 to 2049, 
% change from base 
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Trade is an important feature in the central case.  Exports declined and 
then recovered to close to their initial level, while imports increased and 
remained higher than in the base year.  Our sensitivity results for exports 
(Figure 14) show that with migration less responsive to wage and 
unemployment differences, the adjustment path is more gradual or, in the 
case of zero net-migration, flattened (i.e. not showing a movement back 
towards the initial level).  Imports, on the other hand (Figure 15), are around 
11% higher in 2007 than in 1999, and remain between 10.8% and 9.6% 
higher in 2049 when compared to 1999. 
 
Figure 14: Scottish exports with different migration assumptions from 1999 to 2049, % 
change from base 
Figure 15: Imports to Scotland with different migration assumptions from 1999 to 2049, 
% changes from base 
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4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have tried to shed some light on the issue of the 
hypothesised crowding out of private sector economic activity in the face of a 
large and growing public sector in Scotland. Our initial discussion of the 
concept of crowding out concluded that increased government spending may 
either generate financial crowding out or, if that does not occur, there is the 
possibility of resource crowding out. Further, dynamic crowding-out or 
crowding-in effects, with the scale and growth of the public sector affecting the 
drivers of growth, are also possible. Moreover, crowding out, if it occurs, need 
not be complete and may be minimal as both the aggregate price level and 
aggregate real output increase. And it should not be forgotten that public 
spending might, through investment, have resource creating and growth 
promoting effects. 
 
Within the context of Scotland’s political economy, a small, open 
economy that is part of a wider monetary and fiscal union, the probability of 
financial crowding out due to an own fiscal stimulus is minimal. So, if Scotland 
is subject to partial or complete crowding-out effects from its own fiscal stimuli 
they must occur via either the resource and/or dynamic crowding-out effects 
route, and more probably by the latter than the former. Moreover, in small, 
open, regional economies such as Scotland markets tend to adjust both within 
and between economies to ensure that resources, in the form of migrant 
labour and physical capital, flow in response to price and quantity signals. 
Following a demand injection, through increased public spending, for 
example, the increase in real wages, intermediate input prices and greater 
employment and productive opportunities, will over time produce a net inflow 
of productive resources. Aggregate supply will rise and any resource 
constraints prompted by the growth in public spending will be eased. 
 
 In view of the varying possibilities it was concluded that in any given 
case, such as the recent Scottish experience, the issue can only be resolved 
by careful empirical, and preferably model based, analysis. 
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Two pieces of analysis were offered: an assessment of growth during 
the period, and a model-based simulation of the effect of the 46% real rise in 
Scottish Executive spending under devolution between 1999 and 2007. 
 
In the first piece of analysis, output is shown to have grown by 19% in 
the UK and by 14% in Scotland. Within this total, the private sector grew by 
around 20% in the UK but by only 14% in Scotland, while the growth of the 
public sector was much the same at around 17%. In view of this, we 
concluded that it is difficult to argue that the relative weakness of the private 
sector in Scotland could be attributed to the growth of the public sector. A 
more plausible narrative is that the overall weak performance of the private 
sector was due to the collapse of electronics production and the knock-on 
effects on high street spending. Moreover, nearly half of the Scottish private 
sector, embracing financial services, business services & real estate, and 
other services, actually outperformed the UK private sector during the period. 
Clearly, there was no obvious force dragging all of the private sector down. 
The sectors underperforming were precisely those that one would expect to 
be affected by the electronics collapse. 
 
The computable general equilibrium analysis in fact suggests that the 
rise in Scottish Executive spending7 during devolution is likely to have raised 
GDP and employment in the Scottish economy. Resource as opposed to 
financial or classical crowding out does occur in much of the private sector as 
competitiveness is lowered through higher real wages and intermediate input 
costs following the stimulus to demand due to the 46% real rise in Scottish 
Executive spending between 1999 and 2007. But the crowding out is 
insufficient to cancel out the overall boost to demand and output growth 
caused by the rise in public spending. Hence, Scottish GDP rises by 7.2% 
overall by 2007. Moreover, the crowding out effects on the Scottish private 
sector diminish over time and eventually are removed once supply fully 
adjusts. Supply adjusts as real wages increase reducing unemployment, 
                                                 
7 It should be remembered that spending undertaken by the Scottish Executive only has a partial, all be 
it major, influence on potential crowding out effects (Cumbers and Birch, 2006). In 2004-05, Scottish 
Executive spending accounted for 67% of identifiable public expenditure in Scotland and 54% of 
aggregate – including non-identifiable – spending (Scottish Executive, 2006). 
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raising the activity rate and stimulating net in-migration into Scotland. The 
balance of trade deteriorates as reduced competitiveness damages exports 
and higher real income leads to more spending on imports. But as supply 
adjusts thereby diminishing cost pressures, the trade balance improves, 
although it remains worse than in 1999 because GDP and income are higher 
leading to greater spending on imports. But the worsened trade balance is 
sustainable because it reflects the continuing net financial subvention from 
London. 
 
Sensitivity analysis was undertaken to check the robustness of the 
central case impacts to our assumptions about key variables. In view of the 
importance of migration, we changed the speed of the migration elasticities to 
medium, low and zero. In the no migration case, Scottish GDP and 
employment still rise – for GDP to a 5% peak in 2007 - due to lower 
unemployment, increased real wages and higher consumption. There is a 
permanent crowding out effect on most private sectors as loss of 
competitiveness is sustained, but this is not sufficient to produce a negative 
GDP growth rate. 
 
The AMOS model is a sophisticated simulation model of the Scottish 
economy with a fully specified supply side, incorporating capacity constraints 
and endogenous wage and price competitiveness effects. The version of the 
model used is based around a social accounting matrix for Scotland for 1998, 
which provides a separate set of accounts for key agents in the economy 
including government, households, industries and the external sector, 
identifying the income flows within and between each group. Key relations are 
parameterised from estimates based on actual Scottish, or UK regional data. 
 
However, the model does not allow for any supply creating effects of 
the additional public sector spending e.g. via education spending. Nor does it 
allow for changes that might produce dynamic crowding out or, indeed, 
crowding in effects that concern the drivers of growth, for example, the impact 
on entrepreneurship, innovation, skill formation etc. that would affect the 
longer-term performance of the economy.  If there is to be a sustained 
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crowding out impact of a large and rising public sector since devolution then a 
negative impact on entrepreneurship appears the most likely possibility. A 
public sector wage premium consequent upon the growth in public spending, 
even if temporary, may attract workers away from more risky entrepreneurial 
activities such as starting new firms. But, positive effects through increased 
direct and indirect demand links, particularly to local service firms, are also 
possible. We are undertaking research on these matters in both Scotland and 
the UK regions but as yet do not have conclusive results. 
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